From Russia with love: the impact of relocated firms
on incumbent survival by Falck, Oliver et al.
 
From Russia with love: the impact of relocated firms
on incumbent survival
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Falck, Oliver, Christina Guenther, Stephan Heblich, and William R. Kerr.
"From Russia with Love: The Impact of Relocated Firms on Incumbent
Survival." Journal of Economic Geography (forthcoming).
Published Version http://joeg.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/10/18/jeg.lbs035.abstract
Accessed February 19, 2015 10:53:31 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:9969386
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH repository,
and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open
Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-
3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAPFrom Russia with love: the impact of relocated firms
on incumbent survival
Oliver Falck*, Christina Guenther**
,***, Stephan Heblich**** and
William R. Kerry,z,§
*Ifo Institute, University of Munich and CESifo, Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany
**Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group, Kahlaische Straße 10 07745 Jena,
Germany
***WHU-Otto Beisheim School of Management, Burgplatz 2, 56179 Vallendar, Germany
****University of Stirling, IZA and SERC, FK9 4LA Stirling, United Kingdom
yHarvard University, Bank of Finland, Rock Center 212, Harvard Business School, Boston, MA 02163, USA
zNBER, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
§Corresponding author: William R. Kerr. email5wkerr@hbs.edu4.
Abstract
We identify the impact of local firm concentration on incumbent performance in a
historic setting that has quasi-experimental characteristics. When Germany was divided
after World War II, many firms in the machine tool industry fled the Soviet-occupied
zone to prevent expropriation. We show that the regional location decisions of these
firms upon moving to western Germany were driven by non-economic factors and
heuristics rather than existing industrial conditions. Relocating firms increased the
likelihood of incumbent failure in destination regions, a pattern that differs sharply from
new entrants. We further provide evidence that these effects are due to increased
competition for local resources.
Keywords: Agglomeration, competition, firm dynamics, labor, Germany
JEL classifications: R10, L10, H25, O10, J20
Date submitted: 23 November 2011 Date accepted: 30 August 2012
1. Introduction
A common theme in economic geography is that increasing returns to scale at the local
levelareessentialforexplainingthegeographicaldistributionofeconomicactivity.Many
industries have product markets that are national or international in scope and one
typically finds the firms of those industries tightly clustered together in specialized
regions or clusters (e.g. automobiles in Detroit, finance in London). These geographic
agglomerations of similar firms offer benefits to each member firm by reducing the
transportation costs for material goods, specialized workers and industry knowledge
among the firms. Increasing returns are further generated through shared local inputs,
indivisible facilities, better matching possibilities due to thicker markets and so on.
Of course, tight geographic concentration comes with countervailing costs as firms
compete for local inputs. This competition is most frequently expressed in rental prices
and wage rates that differ both across local areas and across districts within a specific
region. With this pricing, it is not certain that the increased benefits to incumbents
from additional firm concentration will maintain pace with growing input costs or
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 vice versa. The effect of increased local agglomeration on incumbent firm performance
is thus ambiguous. In the extreme, greater competition for scarce local inputs can force
some incumbent firms out of business even when product markets are very broad
in scope.
1
This article investigates the impact of increased local concentration on incumbent
firms. Causal identification in this setting is quite challenging due to selection effects.
Economic models typically begin with rational entrants that form expectations about
the relative costs and benefits of locations and choose the best candidate. This location
choice process suggests that empirical correlations of changes in local firm concentra-
tion and incumbent firm performance or survival are likely to be biased from the true
relationship. For example, high entry rates may reflect short-term spatial disequilibria
with favorable benefit/cost ratios that can independently promote incumbent firm
performance and survival and the adverse impact of new entrants on input conditions
for local incumbents is likely to be dampened in these opportunistic settings.
This endogeneity problem can be overcome with random assignment of locations
to entrants. One situation in which location choice is as good as random arises when
the entrant has incomplete information about locations. The entrant will first use
available information to limit the choice set of potential locations. However, after
removing weak contenders, the entrant will be indifferent among observationally
equivalent locations and hence choose randomly among the finalists. This idea drives
the identification strategy in the pivotal work of Greenstone et al. (2010), who analyze
the effect of opening a large manufacturing plant on the productivity of incumbent
firms in the local region. In their setting, the location choice for a new plant by an
expanding firm begins with a detailed review of dozens of possible locations. This
review process, however, yields several top candidates that are often very difficult to
choose among. This ambiguity makes the final location decision effectively random
among these top candidates.
A second setting that overcomes the selection bias is where location choice is driven
by non-economic factors. If decisions are made exclusively according to factors that are
orthogonal to local industrial conditions and future perspectives, the assignment of
entrants can be treated as random for incumbents. Such quasi-experimental variation is
rare in regional economics and cannot be generated in controlled experiments (Holmes,
2010). This form of variation is very valuable, however, as randomized location choices
are over all potential sites. When relying on economic decisions based upon substantial
but ultimately incomplete information, as exemplified by Greenstone et al. (2010), tight
comparisons are made amongst the best sites for an entrant. In principal, decisions due
to non-economic factors and/or extremely limited information offer a wide spectrum of
sites that include (from a local business perspective) very good choices and very bad
choices.
1 Marshall (1920) first outlined many of the rationales for industrial agglomerations. Duranton and Puga
(2004) and Glaeser (2008) document the microeconomic foundations of agglomeration economies, and
Rosenthal and Strange (2004), Boschma and Frenken (2011), and Combes et al. (2011) study the
corresponding empirical evidence and identification challenges. Rosenthal and Strange (2001, 2003) and
Ellison et al. (2010) provide recent empirical analyses of the relative strengths of agglomeration forces,
Dauth (2011) considers agglomeration forces in Germany specifically and Gardiner et al. (2011) provide a
broader European study. Combes et al. (2010) provide recent evidence on the costs with agglomeration.
This paper also relates the work of Javorcik (2004) and Greenstone et al. (2010) on the entry of major
plants into local areas.
2o f3 1 . Falck et al.
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 This article exploits a historical setting with quasi-experimental characteristics—the
division of Germany into four occupational zones after World War II. By 1949, the
three western zones occupied by England, France and USA formed the Federal
Republic of Germany. The eastern part developed into a satellite state of the Soviet
Union and most believed in 1949 that this eastern zone would adopt the Soviet Union’s
socialist system. The fear of expropriation (or worse) prompted many firm owners to
flee to western Germany. They left most if not all of their physical assets behind,
re-registered in West Germany and used their experience and reputation to re-build
their firms.
We study this relocation in the context of the machine tool industry. Our data
catalogue the entire population of German firms in the machine tool industry from 1949
onward, along with many pre-war conditions. This industry is a good setting for
investigating localized agglomeration and input competition effects. The industry’s
product markets are international in scope, but its production processes benefit from
agglomeration economies due to specialized knowledge and workers, exchanges of
material goods and similar. The industry is characterized by strong manufacturer–user
relationships that are the main impetus of innovation in this industry, and it largely
consists of small- and medium-sized firms. While comprising 2% of German industrial
production, the machine tool industry is an important foundation for the broader
metalworking sector.
2
Moreover, the relocation of the machine tool industry from eastern to western
Germany was quite substantial. We identify 33 relocators that fled from the Soviet zone
to the American or British occupation zones. These 33 firms represent an 8% increase in
total industry size for receiving zones. The localized increases ranged from 0% to 200%
for regions, with an average of 11% for regions experiencing a relocation. In total, a
fifth of the machine tool industry present in eastern Germany migrated during a narrow
window of 1949–1956. This was a one-time event, as no comparable prior or subsequent
migrations occurred within the industry across German regions, eastern or western.
Using conditional logit frameworks, we first show that these location choices were
made with very little regard to existing business conditions across regions in western
Germany. The general destruction of Germany during World War II, the displacement
of millions of people within West Germany, heavy production bans and Germany’s
division arguably resulted in very little information, much less accurate information,
about the current state of regions and especially their future prospects. Moreover, many
migrations were made under extreme duress. Consequently, relocating firms did not
undertake sophisticated location decisions, but instead based their destination choices
on heuristics and non-economic factors. In particular, we show that greater cultural
similarity and further geographic distances dominate economic factors in these
decisions.
Yet, upon arrival, these relocating firms substantially impacted local industrial
conditions as the firms quickly regained much of their former production capacity
(Buenstorf and Guenther, 2011). On an average, they survived430 years at their new
locations. We use hazard models to compare incumbent survival by region based upon
the magnitude of this influx. We find that relocations significantly increased the
2 See Sciberras and Payne (1985), Ashburn (1988), Carlsson (1989), Lee (1996), Hirsch-Kreinsen (2000) and
Arnold (2003).
From Russia with love . 3o f3 1
 
b
y
 
g
u
e
s
t
 
o
n
 
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
 
1
9
,
 
2
0
1
2
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
j
o
e
g
.
o
x
f
o
r
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
s
.
o
r
g
/
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 likelihood of incumbent failure, which suggests that the costs of increased competition
for local inputs exceeded the potential benefits from agglomeration economies. By
contrast, we find that new start-up entrants during the post-war period—whose
location choices were more opportunistic—were not associated with increased
incumbent failure rates. These differences provide additional confidence in our
experimental design.
Finally, we further validate the resource constraint hypothesis by examining local
workforce conditions after the war. In particular, western Germany experienced a
contemporaneous inflow of about 8 million expellees who were distributed across local
regions by means of allocation schemes implemented by the authorities of the zones
of occupation. These expellees were critical for rebuilding a German workforce
devastated by the war. These expellee assignments were mostly orthogonal to the
existing machine tool industry. As such, there exists great heterogeneity in work-
force conditions across locations where relocations of machine tool firms occurred.
We show that the increased failure rates of incumbents in western Germany due to
relocating firms was concentrated in regions where labor forces were constrained
due to low expellee inflows. In regions with a significant inflow of expellees and
favorable input conditions, there was no effect of relocations on incumbent firms’
risk of failure.
Our study’s focus on a historical setting with quasi-experimental characteristics
allows us to identify the causal effect of relocated firms on incumbent survival for
the machine tool industry in post-war Germany. The agglomeration and competition
forces for the machine tool industry during the period we study are representative
to those of producers of highly specialized input goods. Machines were tailored to users’
needs and as a result, there were often a limited number of customers worldwide for
one specific machine tool. Thus, the findings of this study are most directly applicable
to situations where an international product market exists, input constraints are
localized, firms have heterogeneous productivities and products require some degree
of customization.
With any historical study, however, natural questions arise as to the external validity
of the results. In our case, it is important to note that relocating firms are probably not
comparable to the average East German firm before the war; likewise, incumbent firms
in West Germany are probably not comparable to the average West German firm
before the war because they all survived the war and post-war production bans. While
these important considerations limit the extent to which we focus on the magnitude of a
single elasticity estimate or hazard rate for out-of-sample predictions, they do not limit
this study’s main point that exogenous increases in firm density around incumbents can
be detrimental depending upon whether the heightened benefits of increased agglom-
eration compensate for rising costs the incumbent firms face or not. While sometimes
the benefits exceed costs, they did not for the machine tool industry in post-war
Germany. As we discuss further in the conclusions, this is an important consideration
for regional planners considering whether and how to attract migrating firms to their
local areas.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
quasi-natural experiment in greater detail and Section 3 introduces the German
machine tool industry. Section 4 analyzes the location choices of relocating firms,
Section 5 examines the impacts of relocating firms for incumbents and Section 6
concludes the article.
4o f3 1 . Falck et al.
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 2. Industrial relocation from the Russian zone as a
natural experiment
After World War II, Germany was initially separated into four occupational zones that
were independently administered by France, UK, USA and the Soviet Union. In the
years following World War II, differences in ideology between the three ‘western’
administrations and the Soviet Union led to a second, lasting separation of Germany.
The western part evolved into a federal parliamentary republic with a market-oriented
economy and the socialist eastern part adopted the Soviet system of a planned
economy. The partition became quasi-official in May 1949 when the three western
zones were merged into an independent state, the Federal Republic of Germany (West
Germany) and the Soviet zone became the German Democratic Republic (East
Germany) in October 1949. Even though the West German Constitution considered
the two-state solution as an artificial status quo, reunification was not expected in the
short term. To this end, West Germany began massive investment in developing the
infrastructure and housing supply for its new capital of Bonn.
As it became clear that the separation was semi-permanent and that East Germany
was adopting a Soviet system, many East Germans looked west in search of political
freedom and economic prosperity. More than 2.5 million people fled East Germany to
resettle in West Germany during the late 1940s and 1950s, prior to the construction of
the Berlin Wall in 1961. Among the refugees were thousands of business owners whose
firms were threatened with socialization. Recognizing the costs of these firm migrations,
East Germany continually strengthened border controls to prevent a large-scale outflow
of productive capital and knowledge, and thus most business relocations were secretly
planned and quickly executed. As a consequence, it was impossible for these owners to
collect or analyze detailed information about potential locations in West Germany.
Moreover, available information had very little content for decision making due to vast
destruction during World War II and the subsequent dismantling of many undestroyed
production facilities (Laske, 1995; Mazzoleni, 1997). For most decisions, even existing
industrial structures were simply not known, much less the future prospects of a
region.
3
The expropriation and dismantling of machine tool producers in the Soviet zone was
largely based on a referendum held on 30 June 1946. The referendum approved the
expropriation of all Nazis and war criminals, a group that included firm owners who
engaged in or were related to the production of armaments. Given that the whole
machine tool industry was somehow involved in the production of armaments, most
owners were subsequently expropriated and their firms were socialized. In this
environment, firm owners who chose to flee were unlikely to relocate many of their
physical assets. Instead, they relied on their intangible assets, i.e. knowledge about
existing products, experience in their production techniques, and the firm’s name and
3 Histories of the machine tool industry and its trade associations suggest that moderate information
exchange occurred between companies in the future East Germany and their Western counterparts before
the war. This information exchange occurred through product catalogues, technical fairs and journals,
and similar. The board of the primary trade association included members from around the country, as
the German firms sought a unified voice in public matters (e.g. trade policy). We have not, however,
identified evidence of formal links between these groups through multi-unit plants, spin-off activities or
similar.
From Russia with love . 5o f3 1
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 reputation. Despite losing a large part of their physical assets, the intangible assets
helped business owners to quickly restart their firms in West Germany (Buenstorf and
Guenther, 2011).
Two case studies of machine tool producers originally located in the Chemnitz region
of East Germany illustrate the setting. In response to the expropriation threat, the
owners and managers of the Wanderer Corporation called an extraordinary general
meeting in Munich where they decided to relocate the company to that city. This was
done quickly, and the company continued producing milling machines and related
products at their new location from 1949 onward. Pfauter Co. was a producer of
machine tools used in gear production that was established in Chemnitz in 1900. At the
end of the war, the firm was being run by the founder’s four sons. Feeling threatened by
the Soviet occupation, three of the Pfauter brothers and some loyal employees moved
the company to Stuttgart in 1949 and re-established it. The fourth brother was detained
by the Soviets (Buenstorf and Guenther, 2011).
All together, the separation of Germany was a hard blow for the machine tool
industry. Prior to World War II, almost 30% of Germany’s machine tool manufac-
turers were located in the eastern part of Germany that was to become the Soviet zone
after the war. This separation of the former centers of the industry, especially around
Chemnitz, Leipzig and Dresden in Saxony, as well as East Berlin, resulted in a 41%
reduction of production capacity as compared to 1938 (Schwab, 1996).
3. The German machine tool industry
Machine tool producers are defined as producers of power-driven machines that are
used to produce a given work piece by cutting, forming or shaping metal (Wieandt,
1994). The industry emerged in the 1800s near its initial customers in the textile and
metal processing industries. At that time, demand was local and knowledge transfers
from customers were important. By the 1900s, the industry had evolved to be
export-oriented with limited ties to local demand. In 1913, Germany was the world’s
largest exporter of machine tools, with a value of US$176 million compared to the US’
exports of US$162 million (Labuske and Streb, 2008). Richter and Streb (2011) describe
the sophisticated and innovative nature of the industry in the pre-war period. The
industry exported 48% of its total production during 1954–1963 (Buenstorf and
Guenther, 2011), after which exports grew to typically account for 460% of West
German output.
Despite its sensitive connection to war equipment machinery noted earlier, the
machine tool industry was built upon a much broader product base both before and
after World War II. Prior to World War II, Schwab (1996) highlights that production
during the interwar period was dominated by general purpose machinery, although
special purpose machines were produced mainly for munitions production. In the
1950s,  80% of the machine tools were sold to the capital goods industry, especially the
automobile, electrical engineering, machinery and steel industries.
4
4 In terms of specific products, turning machines and lathes constituted almost 25% of production in 1950,
followed by milling, sawing and filing machines (11%); grinding machines (10%); drilling, boring and
threading machines (8%); planning, slotting and broaching machines (8%); presses (9%); and wire
making and forming machines (7%). Other product groupings included universal tools; transfer lines;
other metal cutting tools; keyseating machines; gear hobbing and shaping machines; finishing machines;
6o f3 1 . Falck et al.
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 Due to this broader base, the industry experienced substantial growth during our
period of study. The immediate post-war constraints on production were eased in 1949
and thereafter production in the industry grew  3-fold in real terms to 2000. This
strong growth was supported by reanimated consumption and investment (Henning,
1993). Moreover, the reconstruction of Europe’s manufacturing industries was a major
contributor to the sector’s growth as machinery was badly needed (Arnold, 2003).
Growth persisted after reconstruction due to strong productivity growth, low inflation,
advantageous fixed exchange rates, domestic investments in the sector and a valuable
international reputation for high precision and quality engineering (Ifo, 1997).
Our data come from the buyer’s guide Who Makes Machinery (Wer baut Maschinen),
which has been issued annually since the 1930s by the Association of the German
Machine Tool Producers (Verein Deutscher Maschinen- und Anlagenbau, various years).
This source allows identification of the entire firm population of 2267 machine tool
producers in West Germany from 1949 to 2002.
5
Based on the 1936–1943 volumes of Who Makes Machinery, we identify 394
incumbent firms with pre-war experience in the British or American zones. Our focus
on these two occupational zones is due to much weaker dismantling of incumbent
production facilities that can impact our survival measures. Whereas 99 and 70% of
1938 production value was affected by planned dismantling after the war for the French
and Soviet occupation zones, respectively, the comparable figures for the American and
British sectors were just 16 and 28% (Schwab, 1996). Unfortunately, we have not been
able to collect information on spatial variation in dismantling within each zone.
The first three columns of Table 1 provide statistics for these incumbents by region
within each occupational zone. The listed regions are officially defined as ‘planning
regions’. These regions are functional economic units formed on the basis of commuter
distances. Many agglomeration forces find their strongest expression at this geographic
level, making this spatial unit ideal for our analysis.
6 The average number of
incumbents in the 40 regions was 10, with a median of four incumbents. The three
largest centers were Du ¨ sseldorf, Stuttgart and Bochum/Hagen.
Product counts are our best estimate of firm size (Franco and Filson, 2006; Klepper
and Thompson, 2006). We are able to distinguish 36 types of products from three major
product classes: metal cutting, metal forming or special purpose machine tools. The
average number of product types for incumbent firms in 1949 was 1.7 and the average
number of product variants (sub-types of products) was 3.0. The most important
product class varied across regions within each zone.
hammers; bending and straightening machines; riveting machines; drawing machines; sheet and plate
working machines; pneumatic tools; shears; hydraulic tools for metal forming; accessories and auxiliaries;
blanking presses; rolling mills; special purpose machines for pipe manufacturing; special purpose
machines for bolt, rivet and nuts manufacturing and other special purpose machinery.
5 Only one catalogue was issued for 1949/1950, and the 1952 catalogue was not archived. We approximate
1952 with conditions in 1951 for our empirical work.
6 See Rosenthal and Strange (2001), Duranton and Overman (2005), Arzaghi and Henderson (2008),
Figueiredo et al. (2009), Fu and Ross (2010), Ellison et al. (2010), Kerr and Kominers (2010), and
Drennan and Kelly (2011) for related work on spatial distances for agglomeration forces. For recent work
on labor markets and agglomeration, see Diamond and Simon (1990), Rotemberg and Saloner (2000),
Fallick et al. (2006), Menon (2009), and Overman and Puga (2010). Behrens et al. (2010), Delgado et al.
(2010a, 2010b), Desrochers and Leppala (2011), and Glaeser et al. (2010) provide recent theoretical and
empirical analyses of local cluster performance.
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 We further identify from the earlier records 33 machine tool producers that were
originally located in eastern Germany (28 firms) or Silesia/Prussia (5 firms) but
relocated their business activities after the war to either the British or American zones.
These 33 companies constituted  6% of the overall firm population in 1938.
Furthermore, relocating companies did not differ in terms of the number of products
they produced in 1938 from those firms that stayed (Buenstorf and Guenther, 2011).
7
Columns 4–6 of Table 1 describe relocators’ destination regions, their years of
relocation and the number of products that they start with at their new location. All
relocations occur between the end of World War II and 1956. Relocating firms from
East Germany were larger/stronger than the average West German incumbent firm over
the medium-term as measured by products produced. Immediately after their move,
relocating firms produced on an average 1.4 products compared to incumbents’ average
of 1.7 products. This represented a decline from the pre-war capacity of these firms.
Relocating firms, however, quickly expanded upon relocation and achieved an average
of 2.2 products within 10 years and an average maximum size of 3.2 products.
Available historical data indicate that the greater medium-term strength of relocating
firms was due primarily to more efficient production. Buenstorf and Guenther (2011)
emphasize in particular the strong organizational performance of these firms after their
relocation. On the other hand, we do not observe any evidence that relocating firms
have a greater flexibility for switching across products (e.g. to meet changing demand).
Likewise, the innovativeness of the firms appears similar. Richter and Streb (2011) do
not identify material differences in pre-war innovativeness between East and West
Germany.
Columns 7–9 describe the level of start-up entrants in these regions. In total, 1332
firms entered these regions in the post-war period to 2002. The average entrant has 1.3
product types. Approximately 54% of these entrants survived for 5 years or longer and
39% survived for 10 years. Many of these entrants (44%) entered during the same time
period as the relocations, before 1956. Of these early entrants, 53 and 41% survived for
5 and 10 years, respectively.
Visually, the table suggests that relocations and entries have moderate spatial
overlap at most. In absolute terms, Du ¨ sseldorf and Stuttgart are the top locations on
both lists reflecting their greater shares of the industry as a whole. But there exists
extensive variation otherwise. For example, Berlin had the third most entrants but only
one relocating firm from the surrounding eastern Germany regions. The start-up
overlay was closer to existing incumbent structures.
8 One way to quantify the spatial
overlap is to normalize relocation and entrant counts by initial incumbent activity after
the war. The spatial correlation of these normalized measures for relocations and
entrants is just 0.2. This independence allows us to analyze these two phenomena
jointly.
7 We identified 43 relocators in total. We require that relocators in our sample survive for 5 years after
relocating. This restriction excludes a few marginal cases where it is not certain the extent to which the
relocator resumed production. Two relocators from Silesia move to regions without incumbent firms
(Oberland and Regensburg). These firms are effectively excluded from our sample as well. Finally, we
drop three relocations within Berlin that are difficult to interpret.
8 Holmes and Stevens (2002), Glaeser and Kerr (2009), and Rosenthal and Strange (2010) discuss entrant
spatial distributions and existing incumbents for the US.
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 4. Location decisions of relocating firms from the Soviet zone
We analyze the location choice problem of relocators from the Soviet zone to either the
American or British zones with conditional logit models. We have 10 source regions in
the Soviet occupation zone and 63 potential destination regions (40 with incumbents
after World War II) in the American and British zones. For this analysis, we only
consider relocations from eastern Germany as we do not have pre-war traits on
conditions in Silesia/Prussia. The latter are, however, included in the survival analysis
in Section 5.
Conditional logit estimations include fixed effects for relocating firms that account for
traits of source regions. We develop three groups of explanatory variables for destination
regions over which the location choice is made. First, we measure general traits of
destinationregionsin1950:population,populationdensity,populationchangefrom1939
to1950,maleshareofpopulation,(Schmittetal.,1994),shortestdistancetoEastGerman
border, personal taxes collected from region, corporate taxes collected from region,
self-employment share of population, wartime destruction measured through cubic
meters of rubble per inhabitant and wartime destruction measured through the share of
housingdestroyed.Thelattertwomeasuresareespeciallyimportantgiventheconvincing
work of Burchardi and Hassan (2011) that wartime destruction shaped expellee
placement, which we return to below. The taxation measures are our best proxies of
local output.
Our second category includes measures of the machine tool industry for each region
in 1949–1950: incumbent firm counts, entry rates, average number of products per
incumbent, industry concentration ratio, pre-war patenting strength and the local
distribution of production across several broad product categories.
Our third category of explanatory variables—and the key focus of our models—
includes measures of the similarity of origin and destination regions. Thus, unlike
measures like incumbent counts or population, these attributes are specific to origin–
destination pairs. The first of these measures is geographic distance. Distance carries two
potentialeffectsinthiscontext.First,greaterdistancelikelyraisedthecostsofrelocations.
On the other hand, greater distance might have been advantageous to the extent that
firms relocated further away from the uncertainties that surrounded the border.
Our second measure is how similar the machine tool industries are in the origin and
potential destination regions. This factor tests the extent to which industrial structures
factored into decisions. Our measure is a count measure of product similarity across 36
different product types. We measure product types that were being produced in the
origin region in eastern Germany before World War II in 1936. We do the same for
potential destination regions in West Germany in 1949. Our measure sums product type
matches between the two regions, which describes the similarity of conditions for
entrants.
9
Our third metric tests the role of non-economic factors and heuristics in these
decisions. Following Falck et al. (2012), we measure cultural similarity between two
regions as the similarity between the historical dialects spoken. Extensive research in
9 We find similar results when using 1936 traits for potential destination regions, but it is conceptually
better to use conditions after the war. We purposefully do not compare the relocator’s product portfolio
when starting at the new location to the incumbent firms’ product portfolios in the potential destination
regions. The relocator’s product portfolio might be endogenous to the location decision itself.
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 economics ties heightened social and economic interactions to ethnic, genetic and
linguistic bonds.
10 In this study’s context, dialect similarity partly represents familiarity
with norms and conventions of the potential destination region. It may also reflect
distant family ties (Hefele, 1998). With such uncertainty about economic conditions in
potential destinations, these non-economic factors may have been especially important
in decisions.
Linguist Georg Wenker conducted a unique survey of dialects between 1879 and 1888
at 45,000 schools across the German Empire. The resulting data, which contain almost
300 attributes of dialects by region, afford very fine grained comparisons of the dialect
connections between locations. Falck et al. (2012) construct a dialect similarity matrix.
This work further demonstrates that these dialect connections persist even to present in
migration flows. We use their metrics for the cultural similarity of origin locations in
eastern Germany and potential destinations in West Germany.
Figure 1 illustrates the location choice of the seven relocators from the region of
Chemnitz-Ore Mountains in eastern Germany. The shading of the left map reflects the
dialect similarity of the 63 regions in the American (solid outline) and British occupation
zones with the Chemnitz region. Darker shading indicates higher dialect similarity. The
shading of the right map reflects the product similarity between the Chemnitz region
and potential destinations. Darker shading again indicates greater similarity.
The first observation is that distance is a factor in that the seven firms migrated
farther into West Germany than random. Second, the chosen destination regions
tended to have strong dialect similarity with Chemnitz—four of the seven cases fall into
the highest two levels and none of the selected regions has below-average dialect
similarity. Dialect similarity appears particularly relevant when selecting a region that is
closer geographically. On the other hand, there is not a consistent pattern for product
similarity, with a wide mixture of high and low similarities present.
Tables 2 and 3 extend this visual analysis to all relocations using conditional logit
models (McFadden, 1973), finding that the Chemnitz patterns hold generally. To aid
interpretation, we standardize our three similarity metrics to have zero mean and unit
SD. Columns 1–3 of Table 2 enter our key pairwise measures in a univariate format,
while Columns 4–6 include all three measures.
Geographic distance is the strongest factor in univariate and multivariate analyses,
with relocators favoring more distant regions. This suggests that short-term transpor-
tation costs were less important than establishing new locations farther from the border.
By itself, dialect/cultural similarity does not predict location choice. It is a strong factor,
however, once also controlling for geographic distance. Similar to the Chemnitz
example, there is a general negative correlation of  0.45 for geographic distance and
dialect similarity, which partly explains their greater joint strength.
On the other hand, product similarity does not predict location choice. While the
precision of the product similarity estimates are comparable to the other two metrics,
the point estimates are much lower. Product similarity has  0.19 and  0.02
correlations with geographic distance and dialect similarity, respectively, and their
joint estimation does not impact it much. This independence and persistent null effects
10 For example, Lazear (1999), Rauch and Trindade (2002), Kerr (2008), Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009),
and Guiso et al. (2009). Falck et al. (2012) provide more extended references. See also the experimental
results on status quo tendencies of Kahneman et al. (1991).
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 (continued in Table 3) provide confidence that location choices were primarily made
due to factors orthogonal to incumbent industrial structures.
11
Columns 1–4 and 6 report robust SEs. Column 5 shows similar significance levels for
our primary models when bootstrapping SEs. We likewise find similar results when
clustering SEs by origin or destination region. The extended decomposition checks and
fixed effects tests that we undertake next, however, reduce the sample size to a point
where bootstrapped models may not converge correctly. We thus maintain simpler
corrections that can be consistently applied.
We perform a number of robustness checks on these basic results. Column 6 of
Table 2 shows that the results hold when excluding the three regions of Du ¨ sseldorf,
Rhine-Main and Stuttgart that attract the most relocating firms. Thus, our results are
not being driven solely by these regions and potential omitted traits or trends of them.
Figure 1. Relocation patterns to West Germany from Chemnitz region. Notes: Figure
demonstrates the location choice of the seven relocators from the region of Chemnitz-Ore
Mountains in eastern Germany. The shading of the left map reflects the dialect similarity of the
63 regions in the American (solid outline) and British occupation zones with the Chemnitz
region. Darker shading indicates higher dialect similarity. The shading of the right map reflects
the product similarity between the Chemnitz region and potential destinations. Darker shading
again indicates greater similarity. Distance is a factor in that the seven firms migrated farther
into West Germany than random. Second, the chosen destination regions tended to have strong
dialect similarity with Chemnitz, while there is not a consistent pattern for product similarity.
11 The base location choice model has 1759 observations. Crossing 63 regions with 28 relocators yields a
total potential sample count of 1764. We have five cases of a firm in the eastern part of Berlin relocating
and we do not allow for firms to relocate within Berlin by construction (we have dropped the three cases
where this occurred; see Footnote 7). For these five cases, the choice set is restricted to 62 potential
regions.
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 Column 1 of Table 3 continues by including the regional covariates listed earlier. To
conserve space, we only report the coefficient values for our key measures (full results
are available upon request). Among the 18 covariates we include, only population and
population density are statistically significant for explaining entry. The link to
population is natural as it is our main metric of the size of each region, while population
density is only marginally statistically significant. None of the other general covariates
are important and none of the covariates related to the machine tool industry itself are
important. The inclusion of these controls does not impact our pairwise similarity
metrics and their lack of explanatory power speaks to limited location choice planning.
Column 2 takes an alternative approach of including fixed effects for potential
destination regions. These effects capture traits of destination regions that are common
to relocators from all source regions. In addition to Column 1’s covariates that we can
measure, these fixed effects also capture many unobserved characteristics or expect-
ations of regions that existed in the uncertain environment after World War II. The
results are again comparable and suggest a limited role for industrial similarity.
Moreover, the fixed effects are jointly insignificant with a Chi-squared value of 5.21,
further highlighting the limited role of local conditions in location decisions.
Column 3 finds similar results when restricting the sample to relocators that survived
at least 10 years in West Germany. In general, it does not appear that relocation choices
were motivated differently among relocators with short versus long subsequent life
spans.
Columns 4–7 report tests of the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption
by restricting the set of potential destinations. Column 4 restricts counterfactual regions
to those with similar levels of population density as the chosen region, Column 5
restricts counterfactual regions to those with similar population levels and Column 6
restricts counterfactual regions to those with similar levels of industrial concentration
(measured as a Herfindahl index across 24 industries for machine tools using 1925
data). The greater importance for distance and dialect/cultural similarity persists in
these refined choice sets.
Finally, Column 7 alternatively restricts counterfactual regions to just those that
bordered the actual destination region. This restriction removes the distance and dialect
variation, but it allows us to test very narrowly the product similarity index. Relocators
continue to select regions with very limited attention to incumbent industrial structures
even among regions that neighbor their true choice.
To summarize, both the case studies and empirical models indicate that existing
incumbent structures across regions were not a major factor in the location choices of
firms fleeing East Germany. Instead, non-economic factors like greater distance and
dialect similarity dominated selection. This provides confidence that these relocations
provided arguably exogenous shocks to the local machine tool industries. We next turn
to the impact of these shocks on the performance of incumbent firms.
5. The effect of relocators on incumbent survival
5.1. Empirical strategy
We estimate the effect of relocated firms from the Soviet zone on incumbent survival in
the affected West German regions. These firms were quite different from start-ups as
they brought with them (to varying degrees) industry experience and technical
16 of 31 . Falck et al.
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 knowledge, networks of domestic and foreign customers, portfolios of existing products
and similar assets that could be built upon in their new locations. Indeed, these
relocated firms recovered quickly and developed to be as successful as local incumbents.
This group has been taken as evidence for persistent organizational capabilities of firms
that are independent of a single spatial location (Buenstorf and Guenther, 2011).
The large magnitudes of these random shocks, along with the localized variations in
resource constraints for workers that are discussed below, provide a fruitful laboratory
for comparing beneficial agglomeration economies versus adverse competition for
localized inputs.
12 Importantly, our empirical setting is also free of variations in local
demand to a first approximation. As discussed in greater detail earlier, machine tools
are an intermediate input to other firms, and domestic and international trade is central
to the machine tool industry and its wide product markets (Carlsson, 1989).
We begin our survival estimations with 1949. This is several years after the 1945
German surrender, but it took some time for the industry to reorganize. War crime
prosecutions lasted until 1949 and industrial production was controlled by occupational
forces during the interim. Heavy machine tool production was entirely prohibited
immediately after the war and other fields were severely restricted. Machine tool
production in West Germany began to recover in 1949 with the Petersberg Agreement,
which set the framework for West German sovereignty and a new market-based
economy (Schwab, 1996). The year 1949 also marked a clear recognition that the future
paths of East and West Germany would differ substantially, which began the rush to
relocate.
Figures 2 and 3 present descriptive evidence on the differences between relocating
firms and new entrants. Figure 2 divides West German regions into three groups: those
regions that experienced no relocations, those that experienced moderate rates and
those that experienced high rates. Rates of relocation are determined by the number of
relocators relative to the incumbent stock and the high group includes those regions
with ratios higher than the mean ratio for regions that experienced at least one
relocation.
Within a few years of the final relocation, a persistent difference in failure rates opens
between incumbents in regions that experienced relocations and those that did not. This
difference only closes itself after a period of 40 years. Moreover, looking within regions
that experienced relocation, the failure rates are consistently higher for incumbents that
are in regions that experienced high rates of relocations relative to incumbents located
in regions that experienced moderate rates. Figure 2 also shows changes in failure
patterns that commence in the late 1970s that we further analyze below.
Figure 3, on the other hand, shows a very different pattern with new entrants. To
match our relocation sample as closely as possible, we consider entrants during the
period of the relocations that also survived 5 years. As every region with incumbents
has new entrants during the relocation period, we divide the sample into three
equal-sized groups based upon the rates of entry relative to the incumbent stock.
Failure rates are in the opposite pattern from Figure 2. Incumbents in regions with the
highest entry rates have the lowest failure rates, while incumbents in regions with the
lowest entry rates have the highest failure rates. As the introduction noted, new entrants
12 The appendix provides a simple representation of firm optimization under the conditions identified for
the machine tool industry.
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 made their entry decisions and location choices much more opportunistically than
relocating firms, for example responding to short-term spatial disequilibria with
favorable benefit/cost ratios.
To quantify how relocators and entrants affected incumbent survival, we analyze a
proportional Cox (1972) hazard model with time-varying covariates:
hiðtj Þ ¼ h0ðtÞ expð r þ  t þ  0RZrt þ  1RErt þ  Xi þ "itÞ,
where hiðtj Þ is the hazard rate or risk of failure of incumbent firm i located in region r at
time t conditional on a set of regressors. h0(t) is the unspecified baseline hazard
function. We take into consideration the fact that incumbent firms have been at risk of
failure since their founding, even though we do not analyze their survival before 1949.
13
Some of the incumbent firms are still active today. We relate these hazard functions to
relocations and start-up entry in the incumbents’ planning regions.
Figure 2. Failure estimates of incumbents by degree of relocation. Notes: Figure documents
the Kaplan–Meier failure rates for incumbent machine tool firms. Regions are grouped into
three bins: those with high rates of relocating firms from eastern Germany to the region, those
with moderate rates of relocating firms and those with no relocating firms. Rates of relocation
are determined by the number of relocating firms divided by the incumbent machine tool firms
in the region. High rates are those regions above the mean ratio for regions that experience a
relocation. The first 6 years of analysis time is the period in which the relocations occur. High
rates of relocating firms are associated with greater failure rates for incumbent firms.
13 We lack founding years for some incumbents. We therefore use the year of first appearance in the survey
(between 1936 and 1949) as the time at which a firm becomes at risk of failure. Our results are robust
across various modeling strategies with respect to this timing.
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 RZrt is a count variable of relocations to a region. In our first specification, we treat
each relocator with the same weight, such that RZrt is the cumulative count of
relocating firms to region r by time t. In our second approach, we weight the
importance of relocators by their size at entry, which is proxied by initial product type
counts upon relocation. The coefficient of interest is  0 or exp( 0). The latter is the
proportional change in the incumbent firm’s hazard rate resulting from the relocation
of a firm from the Soviet zone to region r. RErt is a symmetrical treatment for entering
start-up firms.
We include time fixed effects  t to capture aggregate changes in hazard rates common
to regions. These are due, for example, to German business cycles or industry trends for
machine tools. The region fixed effects  r control for regional variation in the baseline
hazard rate due to factors like fixed agglomeration externalities, natural advantages, the
degree of wartime destruction in a region or local policies. Given the region-specific
baseline hazard rates, exp( 0) gives us the proportional increase in the incumbent firm’s
hazard rate after the arrival of a relocator.
Finally, we include two firm-specific covariates. The first of these is the number of
product types an incumbent firm supplied in 1949, where we consider a firm’s product
variety as a good proxy for firm size (Franco and Filson, 2006; Klepper and Thompson,
2006; Coad and Guenther, 2012). Larger initial firm size and product variety reduced
Figure 3. Failure estimates of incumbents by degree of entry. Notes: Figure documents the
Kaplan–Meier failure rates for incumbent machine tool firms. Regions are grouped into three
bins: those with high rates of entry over 1949–1955, those with moderate rates of entry and
those with low rates of entry. Rates of entry are determined by the number of entrants that
survive for 5 years divided by the incumbent machine tool firms in the region. The first 6 years
of analysis time represents the period in which these entry rates are measured, equivalent to
relocations documented in Figure 2. While high rates of relocating firms are associated with
greater failure rates, the opposite is true for new entrants.
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 the likelihood of firm failure. The second trait is the incumbent’s major product class in
1949, as technology areas and industries differed in the expected longevity of businesses
(Sciberras and Payne, 1985).
5.2. Basic survival results
Tables 4 and 5 report the basic hazard estimations. We report proportional changes for
the hazard ratio, exp( ). Coefficients41 signify an increased risk of failure, while values
51 signify decreased risk. We cluster SEs by region and statistical significance is
measured relative to exp( )¼1.
Table 4 uses the firm count approach and finds that relocating firms substantially
raised the hazard rate of failure for local incumbents—one additional relocation was
associated with a 25% higher likelihood of firm failure compared to the baseline. This
effect for relocating firms contrasts sharply with the coefficient for start-up entrants.
Start-up entrants were associated with a very small decline in incumbent hazard rates.
The lineardifferences betweenthe relocation andentry effects arestatistically significant.
Columns 2–6 refine this assessment by contrasting the relocation response with
different sets of start-up entrants. First, many start-ups are short-lived, with 45% of
entrants to the machine tool industry failing before 5 years. Columns 2 and 3 restrict
entrants to those that survived at least 5 or 10 years, respectively. These entrants were
perhaps more comparable in quality to the relocated firms, at least over a medium
horizon, but the difference persists. Columns 4–6 repeat these specifications restricting
start-up entrants to the period before 1956. With this restriction, the window for new
entrants matches the period in which the relocations occurred. The results are similar,
suggesting that the effective time periods across types are not driving our results.
While proportional effects are most accurately estimated, some simple calculations
can provide additional perspective. First, Table 4 suggests relocating firms increased
hazard rates for incumbents by 20–25%. The average region in our sample experienced
0.78 relocations (SD of 1.5) on a baseline of 9.85 incumbents. Thus, a back-of-the-
envelope calculation suggests a decline of about 1.5–1.9 incumbents for the typical
region. This displacement is greater than the relocating firm count, but it does not
necessarily represent a decline in overall production as relocating firms grew on an
average to be almost twice the size of the average Western incumbent and smaller
incumbents were more likely to fail. If anything, these two effects seem to more-or-less
balance out.
Second, Table 1 shows that there were many more entrants than relocators. A crude
calculation that applies the marginal effects to the total numbers of each type during
1949–2002 suggests that these aggregate effects of relocators and entrants are
comparable in economic magnitude. This comparability is remarkable given the very
short window in which these relocations occurred. Restricting to entrants during the
period before 1956, the magnitude of the relocation effects are about twice that of new
entrants. Buenstorf and Guenther (2011) demonstrate that relocated firms recovered
quickly and became as successful as local incumbents, so these firms are clearly distinct
from typical entrants.
Table 5 repeats these specifications using initial product type counts to weight
the importance of relocators and entrants. The pattern of results is very similar to
Table 4, with the more refined variation yielding more precisely estimated effects.
The average relocator had 1.42 product types at entry. This mean entrant would yield
20 of 31 . Falck et al.
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 a 22% increase in incumbent failure, which is slightly less than the mean effect of
25% in Table 4.
14
These results are robust to a variety of further specification variants. For example, we
find similar patterns when including pre-trends for regions or interactions of product
class and year fixed effects. We find comparable outcomes when testing simpler
indicator variables for pre–post relocations to a region. Many relocating firms go to
three regions of Du ¨ sseldorf, Rhine-Main and Stuttgart. We find very similar results
when including interactions of year effects and indicator variables for being in these
three regions. Across multiple techniques, the higher incumbent failure rate following
relocations emerges with a generally consistent economic magnitude.
Figures 2 and 3 show visible changes after the mid-1970s in survival conditions due to
many adjustments occurring in the machine tool industry, ranging from exchange rate
adjustments to the introduction of computer-based technologies.
15 German reunifica-
tion and the collapse of the Soviet Union are major events toward the end of our sample
period and the industry faced strong Asian competition in the 1990s. While important,
these events and periods do not overly influence our results. The hazard ratio in our
baseline model from Column 1 of Table 4 is 1.203 (0.122) when stopping the analysis in
1970; it is 1.197 (0.091) when stopping the analysis in 1990. Thus, relocating firms
influenced incumbent survival both in the short-run, during a period of full German
employment and international rebuilding, and over the long-run as firm adjustments
and competitiveness became more critical for survival.
These survival estimations focus on the extensive margin of incumbent performance.
We also undertook unreported specifications of product type counts of incumbents to
model the intensive margin for surviving incumbents. The historical nature of our data
limits us from calculating detailed productivity measures, but product type counts and
survival are often closely linked to productivity (Griliches and Regev, 1995). Effects
on the intensive margin were much smaller and generally sensitive to specification
choice. One exception was (not surprisingly) a strong, sharp decline in product types
for failing incumbents immediately before exit. A second result pointed to increased
product variants for surviving incumbents following relocations. Nevertheless, our
general conclusions from this extended analysis are that extensive margin effects for
incumbent survival were much more important than intensive margin differences for
surviving firms.
5.3. Exploring the source of input competition in the local labor market
As a final step, we investigate more closely the input competition mechanism. The
German labor force was devastated by the war and a very important factor in
rebuilding this labor force was the distribution of expellees. Expellees were German
14 This differential suggests that larger relocations may have had disproportionate effects, but that
non-linearities in treatment would be second order in importance. Along these lines, unreported
specifications find evidence that relocations of larger firms had additional effects for incumbent failure,
but these differences are not statistically significant. This may in part descend from the fact that many
relocators with small initial product type counts were able to restore production capacity quickly upon
arrival.
15 The changes are discussed in Marx (1979), Carlsson (1989), Glunk (1991), Wieandt (1994), Schwab
(1996), Fleischer (1997), Ifo (1997), Hirsch-Kreinsen (2000), Arnold (2003), Roy (2003), Roy and
McEvily (2004), Verein Deutscher Werkzeugmaschinenfabriken e.V. (2005), and Conrad (2006).
Guenther (2009) provides an extended review.
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 citizens or ethnic Germans who lived within the eastern German borders as they
existed 1917–1937 or in Austria–Hungary before or during the war (§1, Federal Expellee
Law, 19 May 1953). Late in World War II, these individuals were forced by the Soviet
Red Army to leave their homelands and settle within the new borders of Germany
or Austria. This expulsion was furthered by the Potsdam Treaty. Almost 12 million
ethnic Germans fled or were expelled from their homes in East Prussia, Pomerania,
Silesia, East Brandenburg and the Sudetenland to find refuge in other German states.
A total of 8 million expellees came to West Germany while 4 million settled in East
Germany.
Expellees had little choice in where they were settled, being generally distributed
across regions based on the availability of food and housing by the authorities. These
often tended to be more rural locations or areas with less wartime destruction.
Burchardi and Hassan (2011) examine these expellees and their social ties after German
reunification. Important for our study, Burchardi and Hassan (2011) demonstrate that
these expellees were placed across German regions systemically by factors that we found
earlier to be of limited importance for explaining machine tool relocation. The only
overlap is potentially in population density, which we further test below.
At first, it was difficult for the expellees to work. For example, their formal
qualifications were frequently not recognized as valid. However, West Germany
enacted the Federal Expellee Law (Bundesvertriebenengesetz) in 1953 that regulated the
expellees’ status and granted them full access to the local labor market. This exogenous
push provides important variation in local workforce conditions. Competition for
employees was weaker in planning regions with a higher influx of expellees. Moreover,
the differences across regions were quite substantial. The last column in Table 1 shows
the variation in expellee shares. Data are available in eight bins from the Bundesminister
fu¨r Heimatvertriebene (1952). Out of 40 planning regions in our incumbent sample, 8
had an expellee influx of510%, while five zones had an influx430%.
We group regions into three bins based upon these expellee shares. Low shares are
(0%, 10%), medium shares are (10%, 20%) and high shares are those 420%. These
three groups are of equal size with respect to the number of relocations. Moreover, each
of these bins contains one of the three largest destinations for relocations. Du ¨ sseldorf is
among the lowest shares, Rhine-Main is in the middle bin and Stuttgart is among the
highest shares. This extensive variation is a fortunate byproduct of the different
circumstances driving on the one hand the spatial distributions of machine tool
relocations and, on the other hand, of expellees. The spatial correlation of the expellee
shares and the machine tool relocations is  0.19.
16
Table 6 shows that the impact of relocating firms on incumbent survival was
particularly strong in regions with lower labor influx due to expellees. Columns 1–3 use
firm counts to model firm inflows similar to Table 4, while Columns 4–6 use the product
type counts method of Table 5. The first and fourth columns demonstrate this pattern
16 The labor shortages the 1950s and 1960s were extreme. Their severity led Germany to negotiate guest
worker agreements from 1955 on with Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and
Yugoslavia. Until the end of these agreements in 1973, nearly 3 million guest workers came to West
Germany. These guest workers mostly worked as unskilled workers in manufacturing, similar to
expellees. The post-war census shows that the spatial correlation of the share of guest workers and
expellees is significantly negative. This is evidence that regions that experienced a relatively large inflow
of expellees were—at least in the 1950s and early 1960s—less constrained in their economic development
since they had a large pool of labor to draw from.
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 for the full sample. Regions with low labor influx experienced the fiercest competition
for labor and the effect of relocations on incumbent survival was twice the sample
average. The increase in the incumbents’ risk of failure is somewhat smaller in the
intermediate group of regions. Most important, there was no increase in failure among
regions with the largest expellee influx. Table 6’s estimations jointly measure these
effects and we find similar results when separately considering each group of expellee
shares.
Columns 2 and 5 also show these results hold when restricting the sample to regions
with moderate population density. We undertake this robustness check due to the tilt
toward rural areas in expellee distributions. Expellees often ended up in rural parts
because cities were most affected by the bombings. Restricting the sample to more rural
areas thus checks whether wartime destruction might be a confounding factor that
influenced both the inflow of expellees and the survival perspectives of incumbents.
There are insufficient observations among regions with moderate population densities
to estimate the low expellee effect, but we are able to compare the middle and high
expellee regions. This is effectively a matching exercise among areas of comparable
population density and the estimations show that the risk of failure was larger in the
regions that experienced less of an expellee labor inflow. Columns 3 and 6 also show
comparable results when using entrant counts before 1956. These estimations suggest
that resource constraints were particularly important in how relocations impacted
incumbents.
6. Conclusions
The relocation of the machine tool industry from the Soviet zone of post-war Germany
to western regions is a unique setting for studying the impact of industrial structures on
incumbent survival. The location decisions by migrating owners—driven mostly by
non-economic factors and undertaken hastily due to extreme duress—offers an
exogenous shock to local industries that is rare in economic geography. We find that
relocations increased a local incumbent’s risk of failure by  25%. These effects were
particularly acute in locations with constrained labor resources; they also differ
substantially from more opportunistic entrants.
Our review of the evidence leads us to the tentative conclusion that welfare likely did
not decline as a result of the migration, at least in the medium run and longer. The
relocating firms were quite strong and experienced substantial growth in their new
home regions; many of these firms are still in operation today. To the limited extent that
we can differentiate across incumbents using measures like product counts, the
displacement also appears to have occurred among smaller/weaker incumbents.
Throughout this period, the industry experienced growth and strong employment and
our data suggest that relocating firms would have had the size to absorb employment
from displaced firms. Thus, the reallocation of resources and selection effects would
likely have not reduced welfare in the medium run and longer. Unfortunately, the
historical record and data granularity are insufficient for making stronger statements
about ultimate welfare gains versus balanced net effects. Likewise, we are unable to
undertake assessments of the short-run transition that may have included localized
worker displacement that would have been costly.
Though based on an historical time episode and one specific industry, our results
show that heightened firm density can raise costs for incumbent firms in addition to the
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 often-cited agglomeration benefits. This is an important consideration, for example,
when policy makers contemplate efforts to attract large firms to their local areas versus
other alternatives (Falck et al., 2010; Duranton, 2011).
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Appendix
A simple representation of firm optimization under the conditions identified for the
machine tool industry is p.g(n).f(l) w(n).l c, where f(l) is a concave production
technology in the labor input l and c is a fixed cost of operation (both specific to a firm).
The size of the industry in the local area is n. We in turn discuss each element of this
model. First, due to the export nature of the industry and relatively small size of firms,
the price of output p is determined by national or international product markets and is
exogenous to the local area. The records suggest demand from Europe was very strong
and with limited price competition and perhaps sensitivity. Second, the function g(n)
is a reduced-form expression of agglomeration economies that is increasing in n.
The function w(n) similarly represents the impact of greater local industry size on input
prices. Depending upon the underlying model, local industry growth may raise
productivity due to agglomeration economies, raise input prices due to resource com-
petition in the local area or both. Until the 1970s, Germany was at full employment.
Workers were also spatially fixed, especially expellee labor, to a first approximation.
Thus, increases in n likely raised local wage costs. Third, firms have heterogeneous
productivity f(l) due to specialized products, technology levels, managerial capabilities
and similar. The best evidence (e.g. observed firm product counts, growth of relocating
firms) would also suggest moderate scaling capacity. Finally, the firms face fixed cost of
operations. Fixed costs are evident in the substantial exports (Melitz, 2003), patenting
and similar innovations and the factors above. Shut-down conditions for incumbents
(participation constraints) and first-order conditions for optimal firm size depend upon
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 the relative strengths of these effects. Thus, the firm’s economics appear to include
a relatively flat demand curve, a supply curve with a substantial upward slope for
the short- and medium-run and fixed costs that operating efforts must exceed. Our
evidence and these economic features suggest that incumbent displacement due to
Schumpeterian competition may have occurred, but that the push on local resources
caused by the new entrants may have been the more important factor in incumbent
closure. This may have been because the unit economics of production became
unprofitable. More likely, operating returns could no longer meet the fixed costs
of production. Greenstone et al. (2010) and Acemoglu et al. (2012) provide a more
extended discussion of this theoretical backdrop. Okubo et al. (2010) model sorting of
firms by efficiency across areas with different market potential. Our analysis does not
consider endogenous sorting as incumbent locations are fixed and the location choice
models suggest relocating firms did not factor market sizes (much less future market
potential) into their decisions.
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